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EAST EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

Rights, aspirations and state action in Eastern European constitutions.

SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW
By CassR. Sunstein
The theory of what belongs in a constitution remains in a
surprisingly primitive state. Indeed, the theory has been
in transition in the last hundred, fifty, or even twentyfive years. With respect to the matter of rights, scholars
have suggested that there have been three distinct generations of understandings. The "first generation" rights
involve the conventional civil and political liberties, most
prominently the right to own property, to freedom of
contract, to freedom of speech, and to freedom of religion. The "second generation"-still quite controversialincludes rights to positive state protection of human wellbeing, including the right to social security, to decent
housing, to leisure, and to food. The "third generation" of
rights involves the environment, peace, and economic
development. The act of constitution-making in Eastern
Europe-against the backdrop of the demise of Communism-affords a distinctive opportunity for self-conscious
reflection about the proper place of different conceptions
of rights in a constitution. What emerges should provide
important, and quite general, lessons about the theory
and practice of constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism, East and West
In approaching the current drafts, it is useful to distinguish between two conceptions of constitutionalism, between which the current reform efforts are now poised.
Most of the old-regime Eastern European constitutions
were similar to or modelled on the Stalinist constitution
of the Soviet Union. Westerners often think that Sovietstyle constitutions are not constitutions at all. In fact,
however, they embody a distinctive conception of consti-

tutionalism, with three especially interesting features.
First, and crucially, such constitutions do not distinguish
between public and private spheres. They apply their
prohibitions and permissions to everyone, not only to the
government. No civil society is immunized from constitutional constraint. The "state action" doctrine of course
plays an important role in American constitutionalism,
immunizing the behavior of private persons (and corporations) from constitutional constraints. The Soviet constitution contains no such doctrine, and the same is true
for the post-1946 constitutions of Poland, East Germany,
Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Czechoslovakia. The
refusal to incorporate a state action doctrine in these constitutions is a predictable consequence of the attack on the
public-private distinction and the traditional Communist
reluctance to foster a civil society independent of the state.
Second, such constitutions contain duties as well as
rights. They do not merely grant privileges to citizens,
but also impose obligations on them. The Soviet constitution, for example, created a duty for citizens "to make
thrifty use of the people's wealth" (Article 61), "to preserve and protect socialist property" (Article 61), to "work
conscientiously" (Article 60), and "to concern themselves
with the upbringing of children" (Article 65).
Finally, and most important, the central provisions
of Soviet-style constitutions set out very general social
aspirations or commitments. Their provisions are designed to state those aspirations-not to create concrete
entitlements that citizens can attempt to vindicate,
through an independentjudiciary and as a matter of ordinary law, against government officials. In fact, nojudicial enforcement of constitutional rights is authorized.
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The absence ofjudicial enforcement helps in turn to account for the existence of broad aspirations. The existence of judicial enforcement disciplines and limits the
category of protected rights, restricting it to matters over
which court superintendence is most plausible.
In Soviet-style constitutions, the enumerated aspirations include a wide range of "positive" rights. I put the
term "positive" in quotation marks because some of the
so-called negative rights in Western democracies have a
positive dimension. The rights to private property and
freedom of contract, for example, require state institutions to be available to provide positive protection on
their behalf. In this way the distinction between negative
and positive rights-as traditionally understood in American law-is no distinction at all. It is nonetheless perfectly
possible to understand the difference between the rights
protected in different legal systems. Thus, for example,
the Soviet constitution includes the right to work (Art.
40), the right to rest and leisure (Art. 41), the right to
health protection (Art. 42), and the right to maintenance
in old age, sickness, and disability (Art. 43). The Polish
constitution includes the right to work (Art. 68), the right
to rest and leisure (Art. 69), and the right to health protection (Art. 70). The Bulgarian constitution offers the right
to a holiday (Art. 42), the right to work (Art. 40), the
right to labor safety (Art. 41), the right to social security
(Art. 43), and the right to free medical care (Art. 47).
Along each of these dimensions, Western constitutions are of course quite different. Their provisions
generally apply only to the government, and not to private actors (with prominent exceptions such as our Thirteenth Amendment). The distinction is conventionally
justified as a means of protecting and fostering a private
realm, or civil society, by insulating it from constitutional
constraints. Of course a legislature may impose such
constraints, and this is far from uncommon in the United
States. For example, the proscription on race and sex
discrimination is generally applied to nongovernmental
entities. But it is important, both practically and symbolically, that the proscription is remitted to democratic processes, and is not constitutionally mandated.
Western constitutions also fail to impose duties; instead they create rights. In one sense, of course, the opposition between rights and duties is unhelpful. To create a
right is to impose a duty. If one person has a right to
property, other people have a duty not to trespass. If you

have a right to be free from racial discrimination, others
are under a duty not to act on the basis of the color of your
skin. Because legal rights create legal duties, and vice
versa, the apparent failure of Western constitutionalism
to create duties must be understood through the lens of
the state action doctrine. The rights created by such
constitutions generally do not run against private persons. It is therefore the state, and not private persons, that
is under constitutionally enforceable duties. Soviet-style
constitutions are distinctive in their willingness expressly
to impose duties on private persons.
Most important, Western constitutions aim to create
solid individual rights, ones that can be invoked by individual citizens, whenever they see fit, in an independent
tribunal authorized to bar governmental action. Western constitutions generally do not include broad aspirations, and they usually avoid "positive" rights of the sort
that is characteristic of Soviet-style documents. In
America, it has sometimes been urged that broad constitutional provisions be interpreted to create such rights,
most notably the right to subsistence. These arguments
have had no success in the courts. Whether or not the
courts should have taken arguments of this sort more
seriously, the current outcomes are consistent with the
general tendency to reject positive rights of this kind.
The Lasting Legacy of Communism? Or a Third
Way?
With this background, we are in a position to make some
general comments about the rights recognized in the draft
constitutions and the new constitutions of Bulgaria and
Hungary. There are many surprising developments here.
One of the most remarkable features of these documents
is that in many respects, they are much closer to their
Soviet-style predecessors than to Western constitutions.
Like Soviet-style constitutions, they do not make distinctions between the public and private spheres. In general,
the text of all of the drafts suggest that they apply equally
.to public and private actors. The constitutions do not
attempt to foster or even anticipate a civil society, except
insofar as they make occasional references to religious
institutions or labor unions.
To be sure, it is unclear to what extent some constitutional rights can be raised against the private sphere. The
right to protection of property against takings without
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compensation, for example, seems to run only against
official organs. The same is almost certainly true of the
right to free education and to social security. But there is
no general understanding, in any of these documents,
that the constitution applies only to the government. In
this respect, the drafts are a surprisingly conspicuous outgrowth of their predecessors.
Equally remarkably, every one of the draft constitutions contains a rich array of welfare entitlements. In this
regard, the draft constitutions generally go well beyond
their Communist predecessors. The Albanian constitution is typical. It includes the right to work, the right to
remuneration in cases of work stoppage, the right to a
paid holiday, the right to recreation, the right to social
security, guaranteed free medical service, and paid maternity leave. The Polish draft is quite similar. The Czech
draft includes the right to work, the right to safe working
conditions, the right to recreation after work and to a
paid holiday, and the right to social security. It also provides rights to education and training for the disabled.
The Czechoslovak draft includes in addition to these the
right to a sound and worthy environment-a right found
in the new Hungarian constitution and in the Slovak and
Romanian drafts as well. The Bulgarian constitution
contains many such rights, with especially vigorous commitments to the environment. The Lithuanian draft protects the right to an adequate living standard and to adequate and safe working conditions, as well as the general
right to "adequate payment." Many of the drafts contain
duties.
At the same time, the draft constitutions contain a
large set of rights that are quite foreign to the Communist
documents. Most notably, every one of the drafts, including the Hungarian constitution, includes the right to
private ownership of property. There are differences in
formulations. The Albanian draft, for example, guarantees private ownership, but also states that the "land and
underground resources, the mines, forests, waters, natural resources of energy, means of communication of national importance, means of railway transportation, telecommunications, radio and TV stations, and cinematography are the property of the state" (Art. 12). It is especially notable to see a constitutional principle of public
ownership of the means of communication-a principle
that appears in no other document, and that is likely to
provide a large obstacle to freedom of expression. Even

the Albanian draft, however, makes it clear that the law
will recognize and guarantee private ownership of property (Art. 15).
We might think of private property and freedom of
contract as the foundational liberties of a system built on
the principle of free markets. Surprisingly, however, not
one of the documents contains a general protection of
freedom of contract. Contractual liberty is conspicuously
absent from the drafts-conspicuous in view of the apparent shift to a market economy. All of the documents
do protect the right to choose ajob, and building on this
idea, some of them guarantee somewhat broader rights of
contractual liberty in connection with employment. Thus
the Czechoslovak draft also protects against forced labor,
and singles out for protection the (especially ambiguous)
right to enterprise and other economic initiatives; this
latter provision finds a close parallel in the Hungarian
constitution.
There may be an eventual conflict between broadly
guaranteed rights of freedom of choice in employment
on the one hand and constitutionally-compelled regulation of the labor market on the other. Free choice in labor
markets is often said to entail constraints on governmental controls on those markets. The tension will predictably
arise in Eastern Europe. The existence of potentially
conflicting provisions in the draft constitutions attests to
the current ambivalence about unconstrained markets, at
least with respect to employment.
Writing Constitutions Against the Past
The draft constitutions also contain an extraordinary
panoply of other rights. For present purposes I will be
very brief. What we might call "participatory rights" are
generally included-including the freedom to speak, to
vote, to join and leave associations, and to strike. The
Albanian constitution, for example, grants a general right
to elect and to be elected to all citizens over the age of 18.
There are broadly defined rights against the police. In
their range and detail, these go well beyond the American constitution, and give a remarkable picture of the
abuses against which the post-Communist nations have
thought it most necessary to guard. In view of the widespread denial of political rights under Communism, and
the frequent brutality of the police during that period,
these provisions are of particular interest.
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Moreover, discrimination on the basis of ethnicity,
religion, and sex is peculiarly likely to arise in the wake of
Communism. Antidiscrimination provisions of some sort
appear in all the documents, and the particular wording
of the relevant provisions of course bear on this threat. It
is conspicuous in this regard that the Bulgarian constitution contemplates compulsory instruction in the Bulgarian language, specifically prohibits any organization or
alliance along ethnic lines or attempting to foster ethnicity,
and refuses to put ethnic minorities on a plane of equality. Several of the drafts expressly forbid sex discrimination, but many do not. Protections against discrimination
on the basis of religion and ethnicity take a variety of
different forms. They also set out a range of protections
in the criminaljustice system. Several of them bar capital
punishment. Many of the protected rights are subject to
quite open-ended abrogation where the public interest so

requires; the Bulgarian, Lithuanian, and Romanian documents are especially notable here.
For Western observers, however, the most remarkable feature of the current drafts is their broadly
aspirational nature, protecting positive rights of many
kinds, and their apparent application of constitutional
rights and duties to nongovernmental action. On the
optimistic view, this strategy may represent a healthy
effort to synthesize the best of two very different conceptions of constitutionalism. Pessimists, on the other hand,
would argue that an approach of this sort will seriously
endanger the transition to civil society and a market
economy-and perhaps threaten constitutionalism itself.
Drafts andfinalversions ofCentraland Eastern Europeanconstitutions may be obtainedfrom the Centerforthe Study ofConstitutionalism in Eastern Europe.

Some preliminary notes on the intransigence of ethnic politics.

STRONG CAUSES, WEAK CURES
By Claus Offe
Large parts of the Western public in general and liberal
intellectuals in particular are dismayed by the outbursts
of nationalist politics and ethnic strife that have emerged
in the post-Communist societies. At the risk of increasing
their dismay, I would argue (a) that the "ethnification" of
the politics of transition is the outcome of powerful causal
forces that cannot easily be wished away, and (b) that it is
exceedingly difficult to design institutional or constitutional arrangements that would conform to universalist
standards and pave the way for the peaceful coexistence
of ethnic groups within East European states. In short,
the ills of ethnic politics have strong causes and weak
cures.
The "ethnification" of politics involves several interrelated strategies. First, territorial boundaries are drawn
in a way that maximizes ethnic homogeneity. Second,
policies are pursued which differentiate the status rights
of citizens according to ethnic affiliation. Third, policies
are proposed, advocated and resisted, and political parties

and other associations formed, in the name of fostering
the well-being of one ethnic community while excluding
those who don't belong. In all three of these strategies,
ethnicity plays the role of the dominant cleavage and the
source of symbolic representations.
Given the situation in which individual and collective actors find themselves in post-Communist Eastern
Europe, ethnification appears rational to them. Thus, it is
no longer enough to convince the political leaders of these
societies that ethnification is inconsistent with Western
standards of universalism and political modernization,
standards to which they themselves supposedly aspire.
What is called for is not moral exhortations but a change
in the parameters of action of these leaders that would
make it both preferable and affordable for them to refrain from pursuing strategies of ethnification.
It is well known that the ethnification of politics,
apart from the emotional gratifications it may have to
offer, involves a number of serious dangers. First, ethni-
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